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IMPACT
Leaders spend years developing their abilities and acquiring expertise in their specialist fields, in
order to become competent and skilled decision-makers. These capabilities are tested during
critical incidents—especially in situations where there is no official guidance or where experience
is lacking (because of the rarity of such events). Training at this level needs to facilitate creativity,
problem-solving, feedback, self-reflection, and hindsight knowledge, building a pool of uncertainty
management skills to fall back on when faced with unprecedented situations beyond the scope of
protocol (or current expertise).
ABSTRACT
Redundant deliberation is a cognitively demanding form of inertia in which a decision-maker fails to
gain any additional advantage by thinking about a problem compared to the risk of failing to act and
deal with the problem. It most commonly occurs where there is no standard operating procedure (to
help provide guidance) or where experience is lacking. This article argues that training interventions,
including ‘grim storytelling’, must focus on supporting decision-makers’ ability to imagine rare, high-
impact events, and construct ‘least–worst’ scenarios to help them anticipate, prevent, mitigate, adapt







You can’t depend on your eyes when your imagination is out of focus
(Mark Twain).
Alison (2019) describes ‘redundant deliberation’ (RD) as
pathological hesitation due to overthinking a choice
between difficult options. It occurs where there is no
standard operating procedure (to provide guidance) and is
intensified by the fact that decision-makers are not exposed
to enough of these events to build up a repository of
expert knowledge (Shortland & Alison, 2020). To help
decision-makers build a ‘library of experiences’ (Matthews,
2013, p. 67), this article argues that training interventions
should encourage decision-makers to imagine rare, high-
impact events. To this end, we recommend a novel learning
method that we call ‘grim storytelling’. This entails
imagining negative outcomes in which each narrative
pathway results in a bad outcome. This act of imagination
enables unique insights into how decision-makers organize
priorities, seek solutions, and adapt under stress. This
facilitates creativity, problem-solving, feedback, self-
reflection, and hindsight knowledge. We argue that, in
comparison with infrequent but long and expensive
training sessions, the proposed short (about 45 minutes),
but regular (for example weekly) act of grim storytelling will
produce longer lasting and more desirable results.
In an ideal world, emergency responders would deal with
completely predictable events. Standard operating
procedures would enable the decision-maker to enact a
series of steps to get things under control and resolved.
However, there is often no protocol to guide decision-
makers in ‘critical incidents’. While the College of Policing
defines a critical incident as ‘any incident where the
effectiveness of the police response is likely to have a
significant impact on the confidence of the victim, their
family and/or the community’ (https://www.app.college.
police.uk/app-content/critical-incident-management/types-
of-critical-incident/), in this article we adopt a specific focus
on critical incidents that are high-stakes, high-uncertainty
and involve the decision-maker being presented with
multiple, competing least–worst options. The next best
thing to complete predictability and standard operating
procedures would be the ability to draw upon extensive
expertise. Ideally, experts would have had countless
opportunities to learn what works in each case. The reality,
though, is that the most catastrophic events have unique
qualities (Taleb, 2008).
A persistent criticism levelled at some or all emergency
services during responses to these critical incidents are a
failure to act in time or even act at all (see for example
Kerslake, 2017; Grenfell Tower, 2021). Although
considerable effort has gone into developing guidance and
standard operating procedures to enable officers to acquire
expertise through repeated exposure, there has been a
deficit of training methods to arm them to deal with the
unexpected. This article argues that a process we call ‘grim
storytelling’ can significantly reduce RD. We explain the
concept, illustrate it with examples and cover potential
benefits based on related evidence of learning through
narratives and scenarios. We conclude that short (about 45
minutes), but regular (for example once a week) exposure
to, and learning from, grim storytelling can complement
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the more traditional decision-making training, preparing
people to deal with the unexpected. Such training might
reduce the time that people spend on overthinking their
options when there is no policy and experience. This, in
turn, should prepare them to make more cost-effective (in
terms of human lives and financial resources) decisions.
Alison (2019) argues that, with respect to critical incident
management, RD ‘is the single most damaging decision-
making failure’. RD occurs at the point where thinking tips
into overthinking and where the benefit of calculating the
cost of each option shows diminishing returns compared to
simply picking one (or indeed any) of the options over
doing nothing. RD leads to failing to act in time (or at all).
Delay creates commercial damage to infrastructure,
reputational damage to the individual decision-maker and
their organization and further catastrophic loss of life.
Engaging in scenario-based training involves one’s
imagination to first create and then deal with worst-case
events. Supported by goal-structured facilitation, the act of
imagining ‘grim stories’ and then being forced to think
through managing them would assist in predicting,
adapting, and responding to, as well as mitigating such
threats. Such approaches assist in inoculating decision-
makers from what we have previously identified as a point
of failure in critical incident response—namely decision
inertia or failures to act. We also suggest that meaningful,
context-driven narratives alongside goal directed training
objectives can assist emergency responders to learn how to
prepare for and prevent ‘unimaginable’ and ‘unique’ events.
Decision inertia and RD
Unlike other forms of inertia, RD is a very cognitively
demanding process. Where Anderson’s (2003) categories
included the cognitively lazy act of avoiding, deferring, or
delaying the process of dealing with a problem, RD is a
cognitively very active, but ultimately self-defeating process.
Power and Alison (2017) established that RD was especially
disruptive to moving through critical incident decision
phases and occurred in situations that were high-stakes,
low-frequency and with high accountability. RD is closely
linked with the process of sense-making. Sense-making is a
motivated effort to understand connections that exist in the
environment to anticipate future trajectories and act
effectively (Klein et al., 2006). Sense-making is one of the
fundamental roles of perception and cognition and, when it
fails, the motivation to act can unravel—leaving the
individual in a state of ‘limbo’. Previous literature on sense-
making highlighted how we do not make sense of the entire
situation but, instead, need to prioritize certain concepts (at
a gamble) to develop a clear picture (Klein et al., 2011).
Furthermore, the source of most errors in decision-making
stem from faulty (or a failure to update) our picture of the
situation (Orasanu et al., 1998). RD stems from two distinct
patterns of thinking that occur within the sense-making
process. First, by perpetual requests for more and more
information when it is evident that it simply was not
available. In this sense, RD not only stems from the inability
to establish situational awareness, but the inability to know
that any further efforts to understand the situation are futile,
and the decision-maker needs to move forward in their
decision-making process. This concept of committing to the
information that you have is not commonly conceptualized
within the literature on sense-making. Second, in instances
where the decision-maker gets stuck in a cycle of
prospectively modelling different futures based on a
consideration of each of the possible options. Though
anticipating likely outcomes of a given choice is normally a
hallmark of good thinking, when a decision-maker gets
stuck in an infinite loop of deliberation rather than action,
they can end up making no contribution to bringing an
event under control. It is then that the act of thinking
creates a barrier to acting and it is then that the person
supposed to be ‘gripping’ an incident simply becomes a
bystander as events unfold in front of them.
Grim storytelling
Few people have the imagination for reality (Goethe).
The issue of failing to imagine has previously been associated
with a lack of preparedness. Similar accounts were given in
the US’s report into the 9/11 attacks, in which the 9/11
Commission report specifically highlights the ‘failure of
imagination’ (9/11 Commission, 2004, p. 336).
Recommendations included the intriguing proposition that
it is, ‘crucial to find a way of routinizing, even
bureaucratizing, the exercise of imagination’ (9/11
Commission, 2004, p. 344). It is interesting to note,
however, that despite the significant increase in scholarly
research on terrorism after 9/11 (including preparedness
and prevention of terrorism, and terrorist adaption
Schuurman, 2018; Wirtz & Rohrbeck, 2017), there has been
little research on the role of imagination in predicting,
preparing, and responding to acts of terrorism. This is,
again, even though imagination in intelligence work has
been advocated since the late 1970s (for example Shackle,
1979, p. 88). Relatedly, even a ‘post-mortem’ analysis of
‘grim’ past threats, like Anthrax (or the 9/11 attacks) can
yield invaluable insights into alternative scenarios (Bartlett,
1999). Perhaps even more bizarre were the director general
of the World Health Organisation’s remarks in relation to
Covid-19: ‘Six months ago none of us could have imagined
how our world and our lives would be thrown into turmoil
by this new virus’ (WHO, 2020): an incredibly odd
confession from an organization whose job it is to do
engage directly in such a prospective act of forecasting.
Our grim storytelling method is based on learning through
narratives and scenarios. Learner immersion involves
engaging on an up-close and personal level, thrusting the
learner to the centre of a dramatic high-stakes scenario
where all available decisions entail different types of
repercussions. Resembling a role-play, grim storytelling is
deeply immersive; the learner imagines a specific place and
time with real-time situations. Grim storytelling requires an
urgent solution within which all available options carry
some negative implications, providing us with insights into
decision-making when facing the rarest and most unusual
scenarios that normal training cannot prepare us for. Thus,
grim storytelling is a resource-light, immersive and
interactive learning method that can be conducted with
relatively little technology and time, both formally and
informally.
In relation to the goals of grim storytelling, the goal is not
simply to allow people to imagine what may occur and thus,
in advance, develop practices and policies to deal with them
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(this would be closer to the concept of ‘red teaming’ where a
group that plays the role of an enemy or competitor, and
provides security feedback from that perspective). Instead,
the goal is to allow individuals the opportunity to practise
skills that will be useful in future scenarios that they do not
have experience of; namely the ability to juggle incomplete
situational awareness and overcome the tendency to
redundantly seek more information, and the ability to
juggle multiple least–worst options and commit to a choice.
In this sense, grim storytelling is associated with the ability
to transfer core decision-making skills, learnt through
repeat exposure and training, onto a new and novel
situation. Transference was originally defined as the extent
to which a learnt response in one task (or situation) would
influence the response within another task or situation (for
example see Adams, 1987). Definitions of transference
emphasize that transference consists of two dimensions:
. Generalization—the extent to which the knowledge or skill
acquired in a training setting are applied to different
settings, people, and/or situations.
. Maintenance—the extent to which changes that result
from a learning experience persist over time (Blume
et al., 2010).
Those who study the psychology of education and learning
have long explored the issue of learning transference (Grose
& Briney, 1963), frequently debating the nature, causes and
prevalence of transfer (Barnett & Ceci, 2002). After Baldwin
and Ford (1988) originally identified a ‘transfer problem’ in
training research, there has been an outpouring of
conceptual and research-based suggestions aimed at
lessening the gap between learning and workplace
performance. While estimates vary, the overall picture is
bleak. Georgenson (1982) estimated that 10% of training
results in a behavioural change. Saks (2002) found that 40%
of trainees fail to transfer immediately after training, 70% fail
to transfer after one year and, ultimately, only 50% of any
training investment resulted in individual improvement.
Hence, by using grim storytelling as a route to practise the
process of making least–worst decisions (rather than
applying a doctrinal standard operating procedure to a
certain, predictable situation), decision makers will be better
equipped to handle new and unpredictable situations
without falling foul of classic inertia traps.
We base some of the theoretical grounds of the grim
storytelling approach on the SAFE-T model (i.e. decision-
making emphasizing naturalistic decision-making, its
potential for cross-comparative analysis of incidents–see
Alison et al., 2018). The model proposes that an optimal
decision-making involves four key phases: Situation
Assessment (SA), Plan Formulation (PF) and Plan Execution
(PE), followed by an incremental and transitional team
learning (T). Enriching the PF and PE with the role of
imagination (Hayes & Maslen, 2015), we outline the
following stages of grim storytelling based on past
incidents: hindsight threat assessment; time horizon and
immediate threat evaluation at the incident time; cognitive
construction of alternatives; learner immersion; and
learning. This process applies to both individual and group-
focused decisional contexts.
The ‘imagine’ scenario exercises can be far simpler,
informed by insiders’ stories, and conducted in almost any
setting in about 45 minutes and at a low cost (for example
audio and video recording of the decision-maker’s
responses for subsequent analysis and reflection and
feedback). This presents an attractive alternative or addition
to (typically) expensive annual training exercises. Before we
cover how grim storytelling operates and how it facilitates
learning, let us consider the dilemma of RD and how it is
framed against incident narratives.
Using one’s imagination to develop grim story narratives is
a compelling learning tool that can assist emergency
responders in developing competency and confidence to
respond to such ‘unimaginable’ situations. Storytelling
enhances learning by embedding lessons into coherent
narratives, allowing practitioners to push the boundaries of
current situational models—even if those imagined events
do not come to pass. Critical incidents are especially
challenging because they are rare, chaotic, unexpected,
dynamic, riddled with uncertainty and very high risk with
unclear range of required responses often not covered by
any protocol, which means that they are best studied in
naturalistic, rather than lab, settings (Klein, 1993) or when
visualization of problems is facilitated. Even individuals in
elevated positions of seniority, and with many years of
experience, will not have had enough exposure to dealing
with such events to be considered experts. Even in training,
learning, and development cycles it would be rare for
senior officers to be exposed to more than one or two
simulated training events per year (each of which might
require two–three days each). The lack of opportunity for
repeated exposure to training for hard events and learning
complex adaptive technical skills would be akin to
expecting an air traffic trainee controller to manage a novel
and complex aviation incident. Educators and trainers
under-utilize storytelling as a formal method of learning
(Gottschall, 2012). Although training automatic high-level
processes may seem onerous or nearly impossible, the
source and common elements of experts’ intuitive routines
(expertise unpacking in interview-based vignette-grounded
stories) can be identified and made available to facilitate
intuitive expertise thus empowering imagination skills with
foresight. Importantly, such expertise should be particularly
honed within group, rather than individual, settings as crisis
response is typically conducted in team contexts and
command structures (although with the inherent risk of
becoming disconnected from team and command). This, in
turn, implies that attention should be paid to interactions
between different actors with different views and
information as a situation unfolds. Such interactions are
likely to evoke strong emotions that play a key role in
guiding attention and shifting frames (Vogus et al., 2014),
meaning that training should also incorporate space for
discussing and reflecting on emotional experience.
Benefits of learning through narrative
Narrative is an essential meaning-generating human activity
that allows access to the personal experiences of the
storyteller (Kramp, 2004). Narratives facilitate thought,
interaction, and knowledge (Hinyard & Kreuter, 2007), with
stories ubiquitous in life histories, myths, anecdotes,
legends, and illustrations. Academics, on the other hand,
recognize narratives in terms of cognition, comprehension,
and explanation (Herman, 2000). Thus, learners can use
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them particularly well when they are immersed in the story
that is presented to them in a way that creates meaning on
personal level (Cho et al., 2007), even where the presented
situation is novel, ambiguous, and unexpected (Maitlis &
Christianson, 2014). Narrative immersion creates a sense of
transportation to other worlds that despite their
recognition as simulation feel authentic enough to evoke
emotions and thoughts normally experienced in real
circumstances, albeit without consequences. This, in turn,
can be entertaining, stimulating creativity and learning
(Kangas, 2010). That sense of transformation also manifests
in mental time travel that allows for imagined ‘what if’ past
and future scenarios and their consequences, producing
invaluable learning insights through ‘safe simulations’
(Suddendorf et al., 2011).
When in a state of immersion, this dualistic experience
(knowing it is not real, but feeling that it is) enables
narratives to powerfully change self-concepts, strengthen
relationships, reduce prejudice, reduce loneliness, and
enhance empathy. An immersive and engaging story
arouses intense emotions, creates personal meanings,
features universal qualities of human experience and
achievement through conflict where pressure and risk are
high (Storr, 2019). Stories serve as a simulation of our social
world, which then enables us to revise plans and work with
changeable, nuanced, and surprising situations (Mar &
Oatley, 2008). They are the optimal vehicle for transferring
expertise and allowing the learner to apply expertise in
unprecedented settings. Immersion enhances learning in at
least three different ways—allowing us to look at the same
issue through multiple perspectives, helping us consider
alternative scenarios, and developing transferable skills
(Dede, 2009). This is also backed up by data from
neuroscience, where readers immersed in a story create
vivid mental simulations of sounds, sights, tastes, and
movement by activating brain regions responsible for
processing similar experiences in real life (Ryan, 2010;
Wehbe et al., 2014).
According to narrative transportation theory, as people
immerse themselves in a story, their attitudes and
intentions adjust to reflect that story (Green & Brock, 2002).
The theory suggests that one can enjoy the benefit of
narrative immersion and its effects, like connections with
characters and self-transformations without any
repercussions (Green et al., 2004).
Transformative learning states that people revise and
interpret meaning through stories (Taylor, 2008). Learning
occurs across three levels: psychological (changes in
understanding of the self); convictional (revision of belief
systems); and behavioural (changes in decision-making).
Learners consider alternative perspectives through
narratives and question and potentially readjust and realign
otherwise unconscious habits. Learners construct new
knowledge by transforming previously unquestioned
frames of reference and reconsidering ideas beliefs and
values that would otherwise be automatically rejected
(Mezirow, 1997). Further, because the learning takes a
narrative form, self-feedback and argument are internally
generated by the learner rather than imposed by the
educator or trainer.
Learning through narrative enhances language, thinking,
imagination and creativity skills (Wang et al., 2008). Using
stories has also shown a positive effect in more traditional
and common learning environments. For example, it can
serve as an empowering experience for disabled students
(Skouge & Rao, 2009), reducing children’s prejudice toward
the disabled (Cameron & Rutland, 2006), helping them
overcome their fears, solve problems better and master
basic social skills (Hakkarainen, 2009).
Narratives facilitate perspective-taking (Lawlor, 2000),
which can be illustrated by the results of a study in which
individuals with and without terrorism training took the
role of a red team in the narrative scenario of terrorists
planning an attack (Romyn & Kebbell, 2014). Such
individuals were consistent in their target-selection
ordering, and any prior military training did not influence
the order. A thematically related study exploring the
hypothetical results of a dirty bomb attack shed light on
the consequences of various assumptions about
preparedness, plans, and action (Bañuls et al., 2013). These
results helped increase understanding about the factors
that are involved in the definition of an emergency plan
and how different actors participate in it. Thus, in our quest
for igniting the imagination and creativity of learners, there
are still some questions around the competing priorities
between recreating fully immersive environments and the
importance of focusing on engaging storytelling.
Supporting grim storytelling with evidence from
scenario-based learning
Cyert and March (1963) found that managers’ previous
experience leads them to search for solutions in the
previous problem spaces. These ‘local searches’ in past
experiences lead to solutions that tend to be very similar to
past solutions. Instead, innovation requires an ‘action-
based’ decision-making style that emphasizes active search
and engagement (Ford & Ogilvie, 1995; Ogilvie, 1998). This
is in line with education research that has highlighted the
important difference between ‘telling’ students and
encouraging critical evaluation (Greenbank & Hepworth,
2008). Watts (2005, p. 69) argues that we should not be
telling people, but helping them acquire knowledge, skills
and attitudes that will help them handle future situations in
which they are the autonomous agent.
Whereas learning through narrative is focused on getting
people immersed in what has apparently already happened,
scenario-based learning requires participants to care about
the consequences of the choices they make (Frasca, 2003).
Scenario-based learning involves a problem-based
approach to learning and teaching and, unlike case studies,
these situations are developed bespoke for different
contexts to sensitize the learners about the content. When
done right, the effects of scenario-based training have been
detectable on a physiological level, producing heart rate
patterns that were consistent with the elevated
physiological stress produced by real-world policing shown
in field research (Armstrong et al., 2014). This was also
supported by a related study, showing that officer
physiological stress to highly realistic scenario training was
significantly correlated to the stress responses of active-
duty police officers (Andersen et al., 2016).
Relatedly, it was found that prospective hindsight (i.e., if an
event has already occurred) increased the correct
identification of reasons for future outcomes by 30%
(Mitchell et al., 1989). More recently, it has been argued
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that one reason why projects fail at a spectacular rate, is
people’s reluctance to voice their reservations during the
planning stage (Klein, 2007).
Benefits of scenario-based learning
Existing literature on the potential benefits of scenario-based
learning is quite limited. Disastrous events, such as fires,
tornadoes, hurricanes, terrorist incidents and chemical spills,
require high-consequence decisions with incomplete or
inaccurate information, ill-defined goals, and the pressures
of time, and a constantly changing situation that
experience and textbook training can help with only
partially. Scenario-based training, on the other hand,
appears to offer more effective planning and results
management (Moats et al., 2008). Relatedly, a scenario-
planning approach was found to be helpful in developing
decision-making tools that can be used for flood
emergency logistics management (Chang et al., 2007) and
planning (Özdamar et al., 2004). In a study on nuclear
emergencies, a scenario-based modelling approach helped
provide optimal routes to maximize evacuation (Lv et al.,
2013). Such modelling helped assess the effectiveness of
different flood (Simonovic & Li 2003), rainstorm (Yin et al.,
2011), cyclone, fire, and earthquake (Spence et al., 2007)
emergency procedures.
In the dynamically changing military context, scenario-
based training was found to facilitate transfer of learning
and knowledge across situations and roles, thus
accelerating and retaining expertise (Hoffman et al., 2013).
Similar scenarios have been used in enhancing the skills of
navy (Grassi, 2000) and aircrew (Prince et al., 1993), as well
as medical emergency personnel (Treloar, 2001). Although
there might be some ecological validity concerns regarding
the possibility that scenario simulations may potentially
encourage trainees to take more risks on the ‘no harm
done in the exercise’ basis, such risks can also be
methodologically controlled if the ‘hardiness level’ of the
simulation is increased by rewarding more cautions
approaches or if the trainees are later invited to reflect on,
and discuss, alternative ‘what if’ outcomes. Scenario
simulations have already helped student police officers
develop subject-specific policing knowledge, as well as
higher level skills, such as decision-making, problem-solving
and collaboration (Werth, 2011). They also assisted FBI
recruits in learning defensive tactics, interview methods,
handcuffing, rules of evidence, and constitutional law,
providing them with a better understanding of how
investigations are conducted from start to finish (Whitcomb,
1999). Scenario simulations were found useful in designing
peace and conflict exercises (Bartels et al., 2013) and early
detection of suicide warning signals (Madson & Vas, 2003).
Scenario-based learning can improve planning in volatile
environments (Miesing & Van Ness, 2007) and accelerate
expertise. Its more engaging and contextualized nature
(Herrington et al., 2003) facilitates the development of
critical thinking skills (Cant & Cooper, 2010), as well as
critical assessment and management skills (Steadman et al.,
2006). Its immersive nature improves interaction (Morton &
Jack, 2005), enhancing student learning (Niemer et al.,
2010), interest and achievement (Hwang & Chang, 2011), as
well as problem-solving skills (Iqbal & Every, 2005) and
teamwork (Nagle et al., 2009).
Rather than being beneficial just to individuals, scenario-
based learning appears to facilitate group decision-making
(Gremler, 2004), design decisions (Liu et al., 2012), as well as
the management of complex environments (Kirkley &
Kirkley, 2005), and urban and regional planning (Zapata &
Kaza, 2015). The work in progress on scenario-based
counter-terrorism suspect interviewing is also showing
promising results in accelerating the generation of more
accurate and richer intelligence (Morgan et al., 2020).
Limitations of learning through narrative
While there is extensive practice on the role of ‘stories’ in
organizational preparedness, (Anderson, 1995), the
conclusions can, if unguarded, compound rather than solve
problems. Such conclusions are based on learning from
past events and involve identifying direct parallels between
previous events and a current event to predict the likely
outcomes (Perrotta et al., 2013). In the assessments of Al-
Qaeda, for example, prior to 9/11 it was held that plane
hijackings were usually used to negotiate. Similarly, we can
see evidence of analogical decision-making in the UK’s
reliance on Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain’s
appeasement of Hitler in the 1930s as an erroneous case to
compare to and then confront Saddam Hussein in the
invasion of Iraq in 2003 (a war-time threat narrative from
the past applied to a completely different and almost
culturally alien context of the Middle East). And then, in a
continuation of this erroneous reasoning, the alleged threat
that Hussein posed (a ‘premature march to war’ narrative)
was then used by Ed Miliband to prevent the British military
intervention in Syria, the reasoning being unclear
intelligence data and a potentially catastrophic spill-over
effect.
At the same time, continuous flyovers by Russian strategic
bombers approaching British airspace added weight behind
the controversial decision to renew the British nuclear
weapons system. Given the historical record of how military
conflicts involving large powers with potent (for example
chemical) weapons of mass destruction develop and pan
out (for example the story of the fanatically resistant
Japanese Imperial Army and the US Army), it is clear that
no weapons are too devastating (for example skin-burning
napalm deployed on Vietnamese women and children) to
be used; the narrative history shows that all types of
developed weapons have been used sooner rather than
later. Thus, the argument used by advocates of nuclear
armament that the principle of mutually-assured
destruction (grounded in repeatedly disproven models of
rational decision-making) makes the world safer may be
deeply flawed.
As with all forms of learning, both narrative and scenario-
based learning can be problematic and lead to unintended
outcomes. Increased experience (Heimeriks, 2010) and past
successes (Daniel & Hirshleifer, 2015) can result in
overconfident and overly risky decisions. For example,
physicians, just like other people (including commanders)
rely on heuristics to fill in the blanks with their own ad hoc
explanations—inferences that fit the data but that rely on
tenuous or spurious correlations (Berner & Graber, 2008). As
their confidence increases, the felt need for checking and
updating their knowledge decreases in a reinforcing cycle
(Rudolph & Morrison, 2008). Such superstitious learning,
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which can be defined as a phenomenon related to the joint
development of competence and the development of
confidence in one’s competence can arise from the
accumulation of experience coupled with one’s direct
involvement in the task execution (Lejarraga & Gonzalez,
2011). It also occurs when the environmental activity and
change is misunderstood, and therefore unrelated to
(although not unaffected by) one’s inferences and activities
(Henderson, 1997). Although both narrative and scenario-
based learning are compounded by issues of ecological
validity (Levitt & March, 1988), superstitious learning, which
thrives on time delays and ambiguity, can be mitigated by
active real-time feedback and greater learner immersion
(Rudolph & Morrison, 2008).
Conclusions
The multiple and ever-changing threats to public safety
cannot be consistently and successfully tackled by a study
of past critical incidents alone. Although their archival
analysis can help generate insights, the hindsight effect,
linear timeline, and availability of all the vital details behind
the apparent, but often illusory, cause and effect clearly
limit the spectrum of solutions required for ambiguous,
uncertain, and real-time situations. This means that once a
coherent chain of events (storyline) has unfolded, it is
difficult to deviate from it and prepare for the unexpected
(Murata & Matsushita, 2014; Palasinski, 2011), which hinders
learning and management of novel threats. Thus, the role
of imagination is vital, and stories can nurture the ability to
envision possible outcomes (Hayes & Maslen, 2015). Grim
storytelling facilitates the consideration of multiple
timelines, as well as management of uncertainty, mixed
signals, clashing objectives and competing interests,
oftentimes against the clock and under pressure.
Grim storytelling can provide decision-makers with a
powerful, easily upgradable, and flexible tool for the
management of new and still-to-emerge critical threats by
regular exposure to deeply immersive real-time, interactive,
and high-stakes verbal scenarios requiring urgent solutions
and management of conflicting interests. We also suggest
that grim storytelling facilitates learning best if it is regular
(for example one session per week), of sufficient duration
(about 45 minutes) and with intensive commitment (of
sufficient intensity to feel demanding). Moreover, sessions
need focus (what specific decisions need to be examined),
form (what behaviours need to be considered) and
feedback (with trained facilitators). Regularity and duration
require senior officer buy in, and leadership and intensity
are likely to be strongly influence by the skills of the
facilitators in encouraging plausibly immersive least–worst
scenarios. The spectrum of these storylines might be widest
if they are developed in a variety of ways, like
brainstorming, focus groups, analysis of past incidents with
and without added twists, as well as creative exercises
stimulating lateral thinking. This, in turn, will allow
practitioners to imagine the unexpected and train for it
more effectively. Such cost-effective learning will stimulate
‘thinking out-of-the-box’ problem-solving, perspective-
taking, and coping with pressure associated with the stakes
involved, possible repercussions and time constraints, thus,
saving human and financial resources.
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